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It reached the point of aircraft being removed from front-line squadrons to be allocated to the "British Volunteer Group" which was to serve under Chennault in China.  The NZ government also gave approval for Kiwis to serve in the unit.  The plan was for one squadron of Buffalos and one of Blenheims.  Provisioning of airfields was undertaken under Operation TULIP and had started in late Nov, around the same time as the aircraft were being requisitioned.  The plan was ultimately overtaken by the Japanese invasion of Malaya - Britain didn't need a covert air force in China and, indeed, had a more pressing need for the aircraft to remain in RAF service.

Dan,

I think you're being a tad harsh on Churchill. it was in Britain's best interests to keep Japan fully occupied in China because it reduced the threat to Britain's Far East interests. It is oft-ignored that Britain's financial support to China exceeded that of the US through until late-1940 and the loan terms offered by the UK were much better - and that despite Britain being at war in Europe. British policy towards direct involvement in the "International Air Force" was pretty non-committal until around July 1941 but from then on it became much more positive, as witnessed by the approaches to the Australian and NZ governments, the implementation of Op TULIP etc. It should be noted that, overall, some 70 percent of the 435 American-made combat aircraft destined for China came from British orders.

Op TULIP originated in early March 1941 and included plans for RAF bomber squadrons to operate from Chinese airfields in the event of war with Japan. Whilst not formally part of the IAF build-up, it's easy to see how the BVG and Op TULIP were on converging courses from an implementation standpoint. By mid-April 1941, work progressed sufficiently to enable stocking of airfields with fuel and other supplies once London granted permission. The intention was to deploy RAF aircraft to China for short periods but retain most of the logistical support in Burma. Winston Churchill took a personal interest in these developments, urging the Chiefs of Staff to make decisions favourable towards China. During the late-fall of 1941, the situation progressed apace as both Australia and New Zealand gave approval for their personnel to volunteer. IAF terms of service under Chennault’s command were being finalised, including rates of pay, bonuses and a clause that personnel would revert to RAF service should war break out between Britain and Japan. The Blenheim squadron would be sent to one of the Operation TULIP airfields as soon as sufficient bombs could be despatched, authority for which was granted on 13 November.

Kind regards,
Mark

the 70% includes the 100 P-40s for the 1st AVG, the 144 P-66s (which had been pawned all over the place but, ultimately, became a Brit order), as well as 33 Hudsons and 33 Bostons intended for the 2nd AVG. The other US-built aircraft sent to China were P-43s and a few other odds-and-sods but the vast majority were drawn from British orders - and this was in the days before lend-lease so all were bought and paid for using hard cash.

The approval on 13 Nov was to start stocking the airfields so one presumes the creation of the bomber squadron couldn't be far behind.

Cheers,
Mark

Zedzil,

The Australian PM was not recommending reinforcement of China. He was responding to a request from London to use Australian personnel to form the BVG and was leaving it to Brooke-Popham to determine what numbers should be involved.

Note that Far East Command was expecting Japan to undertake a considered, longer-term campaign from Indo-China through Thailand before any assault on Malaya. Such an approach would have afforded potentially a few months' grace in which to reinforce Malaya and Singapore by sea into Singapore and also by air through Burma.

Also note that Far East Command had approximately 150 Buffalos available in Nov 41 of which only about 90-95 were actually in use with front-line squadrons. The remaining 55-60 airframes were in storage and not ready for combat. It therefore seems reasonable, from a Nov 41 perspective, to use some of these airframes to induce more pressure on Japan by gifting them to China. The number of pilots in Singapore was far from static - new arrivals were being brought in, some of whom were still engaged in combat work-ups in late Jan 42, so pilots were also available to supply to China. Finally, a signal dated 26 Nov 41 indicated that, should Japan attack Malaya, the Buffalo squadron assigned to the BVG could be recalled to support Far East Command directly.

In the context of the (mistaken) appreciation of the situation by Far East Command, the creation of the BVG made some sense. Consideration had been given to ensuring continued support for Far East Command should the need arise.